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DUE PROCESS IN
CANON LAW*
Preamble

In accordance with the authentic teaching of the Catholic Church,
the members of this Society express their conviction that all persons in
the Church are fundamentally equal in regard to their common rights
and freedoms,' among which are:
The right and freedom to hear the Word of God and to participate in
2
the sacramental and liturgical life of the Church;

A Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Due Process to the Canon Law Society
of America, October 21, 1969, Cleveland, Ohio.

1 [T]he chosen People of God is one. . . . As members, they share a common

dignity from their rebirth in Christ. They have the same filial grace and the
same vocation to perfection. They possess in common one salvation, one hope,
and one undivided charity. Hence, there is in Christ and in the Church no inequality on the basis of race or nationality, social condition or sex ....
[A]ll
share a true equality with regard to the dignity and to the activity common to
all the faithful for the building up of the Body of Christ.
THE DOCUMENTS OF VATICAN 1I, Lumen Gentium 14, No. 32, at 58 (Abbot ed.
1966) [hereinafter cited as Lumen Gentium].
Since all men possess a rational soul and are created in God's likeness, since
they have the same nature and origin, have been redeemed by Christ, and
enjoy the same divine calling and destiny, the basic equality of all must receive
increasingly greater recognition.
True, all men are not alike from the point of view of varying physical
power and the diversity of intellectual and moral resources. Nevertheless, with
respect to the fundamental rights of the person, every type of discrimination,
whether social or cultural, whether based on sex, race, color, social condition,
language, or religion, is to be overcome and eradicated as contrary to God's
intent.
THE DOCUMENTS OF VATICAN 1I, Gaudium et Spes 199, No. 29, at 227-28 (Abbot
ed. 1966) [hereinafter cited as Gaudium et Spes]. "Furthermore, let pastors respectfully acknowledge that just freedom which belongs to everyone in this earthly
city." Lumen Gentium No. 37, at 65.

The laity have the right, as do all Christians, to receive in abundance from their
sacred pastors the spiritual goods of the Church, especially the assistance of the
Word of God and the sacraments. Lumen Gentium No. 37, at 64. "Mother Church
2
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The right and freedom to exercise the
apostolate and share in the mission of the
3
Church;

earnestly desires that all the faithful be led to
that full, conscious, and active participation in
liturgical celebrations which is demanded by the
very nature of the liturgy. Such participation by
the Christian people . ..is their right and duty
by reason of their baptism." THE DOCUMENTS OF
VATICAN II, Sacrosanctum Concilium 137, No.
14, at 144 (Abbot ed. 1966).
3 [T]he laity . . . share in the priestly, prophetic,
and royal office of Christ and therefore have
their own role to play in the mission of the
whole People of God in the Church and in
the world.
They exercise a genuine apostolate by their
activity on behalf of bringing the gospel and
holiness to men, and on behalf of penetrating
and perfecting the temporal sphere of things
through the spirit of the gospel ...
The laity derive the right and duty with
respect to the apostolate from their union with
Christ their Head.
THE DOCUMENTS OF VATICAN

II, Apostolicam

Actuositaten 490, No. 2, 3, at 491-92 (Abbot ed.
1966) [hereinafter cited as Apostolicam Actuositatem].
Upon all the laity, therefore, rests the noble
duty of working to extend the divine plan of
salvation ever increasingly to all men of each
epoch and in every land. Consequently, let
every opportunity be given them so that, according to their abilities and the needs of the
times, they may zealously participate in the
saving work of the Church.
Lumen Gentium No. 33, at 60.
Bishops, pastors of parishes, and other priests
of both branches of the clergy should keep in
mind that the right and duty to exercise the
apostolate is common to all the faithful, both
clergy and laity, and that the laity also have
their own proper roles in building up the
Church.
4postolicam Actuositatem No. 25, at 514.
Let sacred pastors recognize and promote the
dignity as well as the responsibility of the
layman in the Church. Let them willingly make
use of his prudent advice. Let them confidently
assign duties to him in the service of the
Church, allowing him freedom and room for

The right and freedom to speak and be
heard and to receive objective information
regarding the pastoral needs and affairs of
4
the Church;

action. Further, let them encourage the layman
so that he may undertake tasks on his own
initiative.
Lumen Gentium No. 37, at 64-65.
4 Every layman should openly reveal to . . . his
sacred pastors . . . his needs and desires with
that freedom and confidence which befits a
son of God and a brother in Christ. An individual layman, by reason of the knowledge,
competence, or outstanding ability which he
may enjoy, is permitted and sometimes even
obliged to express his opinion on things which
concern the good of the Church. When occasions arise, let this be done through the agencies set up by the Church for this purpose.
Let it always be done in truth, in courage,
and in prudence, with reverence and charity
toward those who by reason of their sacred
office represent the person of Christ...
Let sacred pastors ... consider with fatherly
love the projects, suggestions, and desires proposed by the laity.
Lumen Gentium No. 37, at 64-65.
[B]y reason of the gift of the Holy Spirit which
is given to priests in sacred ordination, bishops
should regard them as necessary helpers and
counselors . . . [and] as . . . brothers and
friends. . . . [The bishop] should gladly listen
to them, indeed, consult them, and have discussions with them about those matters which
concern the necessities of pastoral work and
the welfare of the diocese.
In order to put these ideals into effect, a
group or senate of priests representing the
presbytery should be established.
THE DOCUMENTS OF VATICAN

II, Presybyterorum

Ordinis 1532, No. 7, at 546-48 (Abbot ed. 1966)
[hereinafter cited as Presbyterorum Ordinis].
In dioceses, as far as possible, there should be
councils which assist the apostolic work of the
Church either in the field of making the gospel
known and men holy, or in the charitable, social, or other spheres. To this end, clergy and
religious should appropriately cooperate with
the laity. . . . Councils of this type should be
established as far as possible also on the paro-
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The right to education, to freedom of inquiry and to freedom of expression in the
sacred sciences; 5

chial, interparochial, and interdiocesan level as
well as in the national or international sphere.
Apostolicam Actuositatem No. 26, at 515.
"[T]here must be made available to all men
everything necessary for leading a life truly human, such as . . .right . . . to appropriate information." Gaudium et Spes No. 26, at 225.
"By the natural law, every human being has the
right . . .to be informed truthfully about public
events." John XXIII, Pacem in Terris No. 12
(1963).
In addition, the use of the media is a testament to the Church's belief in two fundamental principles of communications, namely, the
right to information; and the necessity of public opinion within the Church .... Man's right
to be informed is a natural, inherent right. It
is given him by God himself. It is not a privilege conferred by any authority .... If there
have been abuses of this right by any authorities in the Church, we members of the people
of God can only regretfully acknowledge the
fact and at the same time strive to amend our
ways. . . .The right to information, however,
we firmly believe must be stressed today because only a true and complete knowledge
will enable society and man as an individual
to stand secure in an age of intellectual and
moral turmoil. Moreover, the corollary of the
right to information is the right to full expression. The distinguished Commission on Freedom of the Press observed twenty years ago
that "public discussion is a necessary condition
of a free society and that freedom of expression is a necessary condition of adequate public discussion." . . . History affords us many
examples of the fact that freedom suffers the
moment man's inherent right to information
begins to be curtailed. . . .Closely associated
with man's right to information is the necessity
of both Church and State to cultivate a healthy
public opinion. . . .Public opinion, as a symbol and factor of social cohesion, is always an
important element in every decision that leaders of both Church and State must make.
Those will govern most wisely who attempt
most assiduously to evaluate decisions in terms
of such a public opinion. . . . [As] Pope Pius
XII enunciated: "There would be something
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The right to free assembly and association
in the Church; 6

missing from the Church's life if there were
no public opinion within her, a defect for
which pastors as well as the faithful would be
responsible."
U.S. Bishops' Committee for Social Communications, Statement for World Communications Day
(1967).
5 [W]hile adhering to the methods and requirements proper to theology, theologians are invited to seek continually for more suitable
ways of communicating doctrine to the men
of their times. For the deposit of faith or revealed truths are one thing; the manner in
which they are formulated without violence to
their meaning and significance is another ...
Theological inquiry should seek a profound
understanding of revealed truth without neglecting close contact with its own times. As
a result, it will be able to help those men
skilled in various fields of knowledge to gain
a better understanding of the faith ...
This common effort will very greatly aid in
the formation of priests. It will enable them
to present to our contemporaries the doctrine
of the Church concerning God, man, and the
world in a manner better suited to them with
the result that they will receive it more willingly. Furthermore, it is hoped that many laymen will receive an appropriate formation in
the sacred sciences, and that some will develop
and deepen these studies by their own labors.
In order that such persons may fulfill their
proper function, let it be recognized that all
the faithful, clerical and lay, possess a lawful
freedom of inquiry and of thought, and the
freedom to express their minds humbly and
courageously about those matters in which
they enjoy competence.
Gaudium et Spes No. 62, at 268-70. "By the
natural law, every human being has the right to
. . . freedom in searching for truth and in expressing and communicating his . . . opinions
within the limits laid down by the moral order
and the common good .. " John XXIII, Pacern
in Terris No. 12 (1963).
6 There is a great variety of associations in the
apostolate .... As long as the proper relationship is kept to Church authorities, the laity
have the right to found and run such associations and to join those already existing.
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And such inviolable and universal rights of
the human person as the right to the protection of one's reputation, to respect of
one's person, to activity in accord with the
upright norm of one's conscience, to pro7
tection of privacy.

dom s require that no member of the Church
arbitrarily be deprived of the exercise of
any right or office.

The dignity of the human person, the
principles of fundamental fairness, and the
universally applicable presumption of free-

The adequate protection of human rights

Apostolicarn Actuositatem No. 19, at 509-10.

Worthy too of high regard and zealous promotion are those associations whose rules have
been examined by competent Church authority, and which foster priestly holiness in the
exercise of the ministry through an apt and
properly approved rule of life and through
brotherly assistance. Thus these associations
aim to be of service to the whole priestly
order.
Presbyterorum Ordinis No. 8, at 551.

From the fact that human beings are by nature
social, there arises the right of assembly and
association. They have also the right to give
the societies of which they are members the
form they consider most suitable for the aim
they have in view, and to act within such societies on their own initiative and on their own
responsibility in order to achieve their desired
objectives.
John XXIII, Pacein in Terris No. 12 (1963).
[T]here is a growing awareness of the exalted
dignity proper to the human person, since he
stands above all things, and his rights and
duties are universal and inviolable. Therefore,
there must be made available to all men everything necessary for leading a life truly human,
such as . . . the right . . . to a good reputation, to respect . . . to activity in accord with

the upright norm of one's own conscience, to
protection of privacy and to rightful freedom
in matters religious too.
Gaudium et Spes No. 26, at 225. "By the natural
law every human being has the right to respect
for his person, to his good reputation ..
" John
XXIII, Pacem in Terris No. 12 (1963). This too
must be listed among the rights of a human
being, to honor God according to the sincere
dictates of his own conscience, and therefore the
right to practice his religion privately and
publicly. Id. No. 14.

Notion of Due Process

and freedoms is a matter of concern to all
men of good will; the adequate protection

of specifically ecclesial rights and freedoms
has become a matter of increasing concern
to all members of the Church.
Rights are protected in many ways. Indirectly, they are protected by education,
growth of moral consciousness, development
of character; directly, they are protected by
law. Rights without legal safeguards, both

preventive and by way of effective recourse,
are often meaningless. It is the noblest service of law to afford effective safeguards
for the protection of rights, and, where
rights have been violated, to afford effective
means for their prompt restoration.
Phrased in abstract terms, the question
whether there ought to be "due process" in
the Church answers itself since everyone
is obviously entitled to whatever process is
"due." In all governmental procedures re-

s In the use of all freedoms, the moral principle

of personal and social responsibility is to be
observed. In the exercise of their rights, individual men and social groups are bound by
the moral law to have respect both for the
rights of others and for their own duties toward others and for the common welfare of
all....
For the rest, the usages of society are to be
the usages of freedom in their full range.
These require that the freedom of man be
respected as far as possible, and curtailed only
when and in so far as necessary.
THE DOCUMENTS OF VATICAN II, Dignitatis Humnanae 1675, No. 7, at 686-87 (Abbot ed. 1966)
[hereinafter cited as Dignitatis Humanae].
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spect should be paid to the rights of all
persons involved, whatever this may require. The question becomes real only
when specific content is given to the expression "due process" so that what is
asked is whether certain specific substantive and procedural protections are due, in
given sets of circumstances, in order that
the rights of persons involved be adequately
safeguarded.
Most of the current discussion and writing about "due process" in the Church is
conditioned by Anglo-American common
law tradition which requires, substantively,
that no fundamental right or freedom shall
be denied without adequate justification;
and procedurally, that every- individual be
accorded certain specific protections in
administrative and judicial procedures.
Among such procedural protections are,
for example: the right to be informed of
proposed actions which might prejudicially
affect one's rights; the right to be heard in
defense of one's rights; the right, in the
face of accusation which could result in
the imposition of a penalty, to confront
one's accusers and those who testify in
support of the accusation; and, the right
not to be judged by one's accusers. Any
nuanced statement of due process will have
to make distinctions between many different types of situations; the notion of due
process is not univocal but analogous. It
is a principle of justice rather than a specific rule of law.

Ecclesiological Implications
A.

Unity of Authority in the Bishop

It is questioned at times whether this
very notion of due process has any proper
place in the Catholic Church which we
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understand to be, by divine institution, a
hierarchical society in which the fullness of
governmental power is vested in the episcopate.
Bishops govern the particular churches
entrusted to them as the vicars and ambassadors of Christ. . . . This power, which
they personally exercise in Christ's name,
is proper, ordinary, and immediate, although its exercise is ultimately regulated
by the supreme authority of the Church,
and can be circumscribed by certain limits,
for the advantage of the Church or of the
faithful. In virtue of this power, bishops
have the sacred right and duty before the
Lord to make certain laws for their subjects to pass judgment on them, and to
moderate everything pertaining to the ordering of worship and the apostolate.
The pastoral office or the habitual and
daily care of their sheep is entrusted to
them completely. 9
It is the opinion of some that there cannot be in the Church any such separation
of powers as exists, for example, in the
American form of government, in which
authority is divided among legislative, executive and judicial branches of government.
The unity of authority is a necessary element of the hierarchical structure of the
Church and a juridical expression of the
oneness of the spiritual authority derived
from Christ.' 0
If the bishop has the fullness of governmental power-legislative, executive, and
judicial-it is argued that no one could
enforce specific requirements of the Amer-

0 Lumen Gentium No. 27, at 51-52.
10 8 NEW CATHOLIc ENCYCLOPEDIA 61 (1967).
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ican concept of "due process" against the
bishop; he would (in person or through
his delegate), by reason of the unity of authority centered in himself, be legislator, administrator, law-enforcer, prosecutor, judge,
and jury.
In response to this approach, three considerations seem to be pertinent. First, a
constitutionally dictated separation of powers, as realized, for example, in the United
States, is a special doctrine of government
whose particular features are not to be
identified with the requirements of "due
process." Many of the requirements of
"due process," both substantive and procedural, are relevant to all forms of government, even the most centralized. The
right to be heard in defense of one's rights,
for example, is not limited to those who
live in a government characterized by separation of powers. The particular way in
which authority is distributed, or not distributed, in a given society differs according to the nature and traditions of the
society itself; guaranteeing fundamental
fairness against abuse of authority should
be the concern of every society regardless
of the particular arrangement of legislative,
executive, and judicial powers in the governmental structure of the society.
Secondly, the approach, if valid, would
argue against protections from abuse of
authority already provided in the Church
by the present Code of Canon Law. Elaborate procedures are prescribed which a
bishop must follow in the removal of
pastors;11 detailed rules concerning the
competence of courts, right to counsel, admissibility of evidence, burden of proof,

number of judges, and availability of appeal, surround the exercise of judicial
power; 12 and a bishop is required regularly
13
to enact diocesan legislation "in synod.
All of these are in the nature of procedural limitations upon the bishop, and yet
they have been thought to be consistent
with the centralization of all governmental
authority in the local bishop.
Thirdly, the approach seems to presume
that securing the protection of basic human
rights to members of the ecelesial society
is equivalent to undermining the authority
of the bishop. "Due process" does place
limitations on a bishop's exercise of power,
but, far from undermining his authority,
it does much to win respect for it, and
so enables him to govern more effectively.
The declaration and protection of fundamental rights by guaranteeing proper substantive and procedural safeguards is one
of the most important exercises of governmental authority by the bishop. If they are
genuine rights, the bishop loses nothing by
being required to respect them.
B. Vatican II Development
It seems to the members of this Society
that the present moment in the history of
mankind imperatively calls for further development in the recognition of fundamental fairness in the governmental life of the
Church. We believe this position to be
solidly founded in the teaching of the Second Vatican Council:
A sense of the dignity of the human
person has been impressing itself more and
more deeply on the consciousness of con-

12 C.I.C., chs. 1552-1924, 1933-59. Cf. J. KROL,
THE DEFENDANT IN CONTENTIOUS TRIALS

11 C.I.C., chs. 2147-67.

13 C.I.C., chs. 356-62.

(1942).
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temporary man. And the demand is increasingly made that men should act on
their own judgment, enjoying and making
use of responsible freedom, not driven by
coercion but motivated by a sense of duty.
The demand is also made that constitutional limits be set to the powers of government, in order that there may be no
encroachment on the rightful freedom of
14
the person and of associations.
If conscientious cooperation between
citizens is to achieve its happy effect in
the normal course of public affairs, a positive system of law is required. In it should
be established a division of governmental
roles and institutions, and, at the same
time, an effective and independent system
for the protection of rights. Let the rights
of all persons, families, and associations,
along with the exercise of those rights, be
recognized, honored, and fostered.1 5

That the Church must develop adequate
institutions to keep pace with modern society is implicit in the whole program of
aggiornamento which inspired the Second
Vatican Council. The Council fathers declared that the Church must always remain
in harmony with the temporal order "so
that the mission of the Church may correspond more adequately to the special
conditions of the world today." ' In this
regard, the ecclesiology of Vatican II developed earlier ecclesiologies in a manner
consonant with secular developments in
the field of human rights, particularly in
the new emphasis placed on the rights and
dignity of each member of the laity.
Let sacred pastors recognize and promote
the dignity as well as the responsibility of
the layman in the Church. .

of our time, is arousing in the hearts of
Christians an irresistible demand that the
human dignity of each member of the faith-

DignitatisHumanae No. 1, at 675.
15 Gaudium et Spes No. 75, at 285-86.
16 Gaudium et Spes No. 76, at 288.

.

.Let them

confidently assign duties to him in the service of the Church, allowing him freedom
and room for action. Further, let them
encourage the layman so that he may
undertake tasks on his own initiative ...
Furthermore, let pastors respectfully acknowledge that just freedom which belongs
to everyone in this earthly city.19

independent system for the protection of

adequate safeguards for the protection of
human rights. The ferment of the gospel,
which is especially active in the Church

1969

ful should be recognized and protected by
17
suitable legal guarantees.

Each of these statements refers directly
not to the Church but to civil society. But
they have obvious implications for the
Church, since the Church is and must
ever be "a sign and a safeguard of the
transcendence of the human person."1 6 It
would be unfortunate if, while civil societies labored to build "an effective and
rights," the Church allowed itself to remain
at a lower stage in the development of
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The characteristics of a free man are
precisely that he has rights, that he is not
dependent for the enjoyment of his rights
upon the good will of his superiors, and
that his rights are effectively protected so
as to be legally inviolable. The aim of "due
process" is precisely to give such inviolability. For men of our time, the legal pro-

14

17

Gaudium et Spes No. 26, at 225.

18 Lumen Gentium No. 36, at 63.
19 Lumen Gentium No. 37, at 64-65.
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tection of inviolable rights in the Church
would be an especially persuasive sign of
that just freedom proclaimed by the gospel
as belonging to all men. To the extent that
authorities in the Church are able to secure
the fundamental rights of Christians they
are fulfilling an important part of their
service as pastors.

volving his own rights, or temporal goods,
or those of the diocesan curia to tribunals
for decision. 20 By freely submitting to the
determinations of impartial boards or tribunals in matters to which he is a party,
a local ordinary would win greater respect
for his own integrity and thus govern more
effectively.

C. Disciplinary Matters

D. Doctrinal Area

It may be asked how resort to the protective procedures of "due process" is to
be reconciled with the virtue of obedience
to one's bishop. It seems to the members
of this Society that the obedience a bishop
legitimately expects when he seeks the unity
of the diocesan apostolate never requires
a person unwillingly to give up his Christian rights. Moreover, obedience may take
on new significance as God's People accept
not only the decisions of their bishop but
the consensus of their fellow Christians
and the Christian community at large which
explicitly concurs in and supports those
decisions. "Due process" is simply one of
the effective ways in which authority is
exercised and obedience realized.

The more difficult question concerns disputes arising in the doctrinal area. Here
the bishop cannot abdicate his responsibility
as teacher; he must retain his traditional
function of giving official expression to
Catholic doctrine. But it is the opinion of
the members of this Society that he must
exercise that responsibility with due regard
to the total theological situation. A local
ordinary may not make an absolute norm
out of his own personal theological interpretations and arbitrarily forbid the dissemination of views which are tolerated
elsewhere in the Church.

A more precise question is whether in
cases where the local ordinary is himself
a party to the dispute he can be bound to
accept, or responsibly can bind himself to
accept, a decision made by members of his
own diocese.
In purely disciplinary matters it would
seem evident that there is no theological
obstacle to a bishop agreeing, with regard
to particular cases and even with regard
to whole classes of cases, to abide by decisions of boards or courts over which he has
no direct control, just as at present he is
bound by canon law to refer disputes in-

The bishops of a region or of the nation
should be mutually solicitous for the wel21
fare of the Church in every diocese.

20 C.I.C.,

ch. 1572.

21 As lawful successors of the apostles and as
members of the episcopal college, bishops
should always realize that they are linked one
to the other, and should show concern for all
the churches. For by divine institution and
the requirement of their apostolic office, each
one in concert with his fellow bishops is responsible for the Church.
THE DOCUMENTS OF VATICAN II, Christus Dominus 396, No. 6, at 400 (Abbot ed. 1966) [hereinafter cited as Christus Dominus].
From the very first centuries of the Church
the bishops who were placed over individual
churches were deeply influenced by the fellowship of fraternal charity and by zeal for the

15
Should a serious question arise as to
whether a given bishop is excessively strict
or excessively permissive, there would be
nothing inconsistent with his episcopal
office if he were to allow the matter to
be referred to a panel of his brother bishops
for their judgment. Nor, in the opinion of
the members of this Society, would it be at
all inconsistent with his office as bishop if he
were to allow a like referral to a panel of
theologians who have a reputation among
their colleagues for theological competence.
Such a panel, on the national level, would
be comparable to the international theological commission recently established to
advise the Congregation for the Doctrine
of the Faith. The members of this Society
recommend to the American hierarchy the
establishment of such a national theological
commission.
In view of the great complexity of doctrinal questions at the present moment and
the increasingly acute sensitivity of the
faithful to the right of free inquiry and
expression in the Church, it is the opinion
of this Society that bishops will best maintain their authority by involving experts of
different theological tendencies and thus,
take advantage of the full resources of
the theological community. In this way
they will increase, rather than undercut,
confidence in their own authority as official
teachers.
Thus, "due process" should be viewed
as a means to an end. It is useful and

universal mission entrusted to the apostles.
And so they pooled their resources and unified

their plans for the common good and for that
of the individual churches.
Christus Dominus No. 36, at 425.
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important as an instrument to help the
Church realize itself as a community of
freedom and truth. Those securing it, in
positions of authority in the Church, show
their love for the people of God, their
trust in the working of the Spirit, and their
personal disinterestedness by effectively
safeguarding the rights of those entrusted
to their care.
Governmental Context
Assessment of the adequacy of present
structures in the Church for the protection
of rights and resolution of disputes entails
a study of the entire legislative, judicial,
and administrative structure of the Church.
In the area of legislation, such a study
reveals, on the one hand, underutilization
of the diocesan synod in the practice of
most dioceses, 22 and on the other, recent
experimentation with a type of legislative
"synod" or "diocesan council" which goes
beyond the Code provisions for synods especially in regard to frequency of sessions
and participation by religious and laity. In
regard to pro-synodal legislation by the
bishop, recent development of priests' senates and pastoral councils as consultative
and collaborative bodies has opened new
opportunities for effective participation in
law-making and in the consequent resolution of conflicting interests in the Church
through the medium of legislation.
In regard to adjudication, Church law
affirms the availability of a judicial remedy

22 Canon 356 requires a diocesan synod every
ten years. Although such synods were frequent
in the pre-Code Church in America, few dioceses
have adhered to the law in this regard in recent
decades.
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for the protection of every right, 23 but practice has revealed understaffed tribunals and
the consequent unavailability of tribunal
processes for all but marriage conflicts.
Moreover, the law recognizes no right to
judicial review of administrative decisions
of ecclesiastical authorities.
Administrative decisions of bishops are
reviewable only by one or another of the
Sacred Congregations at Rome, a process
which experience often has shown to be
unsatisfactory because of distance, requirements of secrecy, unavailability of evidence
and witnesses, decisions rendered without accompanying findings and reasoned
opinions, and other failures in regard to
contemporary standards of fundamental
procedural fairness.
The contemplated revision of the Code
of Canon Law envisions a broader use
of courts for the judicial resolution of
conflicts of all kinds, and, in particular,
envisions the creation of administrative tribunals in the Church. 24 The Synod of
Bishops, meeting in Rome on October 7,
1967, voted unanimously for the establishment of courts to provide review of administrative decisions. Such courts will fit
easily into the legal climate of this nation
in which the process of judicial review

23

C.I.C., ch. 1667.

24 The reorganization of the Roman Curia, accomplished by the Apostolic Constitution REGIMINI ECCLESIAE UNIVERSAE

(1967), pointed the

way to the establishment of administrative courts
elsewhere in the Church. The Constitution enlarged the competency of the Apostolic Signatura to include review of contentions arising from
the exercise of administrative ecclesiastical authority by one or another of the departments of
the Roman Curia.

traditionally has sought to provide effective
protection against arbitrary administrative
action. It is expected that the new Code
will delineate the forms such tribunals will
take, their competence, and rules of procedure applicable to them. The value of
judicial precedent and the interpretation of
law afforded by the adjudication of concrete cases will enrich the societal life of
the faithful.
It is in the administrative area of government that the Church is experiencing
the fastest rate of growth, with the creation
of increasing numbers of administrative
boards, departments, and agencies to supplement the bishop's personal administrative
activities. Personnel boards, liturgical commissions, parish councils, and other administrative bodies are emerging in nearly
every diocese. The proliferation of administrative powers necessarily entails an increase in the number of persons entitled
to exercise the discretion proper to administrative authority, and hence, an increase
in the dangers to human rights and freedom that are inherent in uncontrolled and
unchecked discretionary power.
The Code of Canon Law is not without
concern for limiting administrative discretion, but such checks as it establishes (e.g.,
synodal examiners, diocesan consultors,
councils of temporalities) have been minimal and are, in many ways, unsuited to
the forms of administrative entity coming
into existence today.
Procedural fairness in all aspects of the
administrative life of the Church is one of
the pressing needs of our time; indeed, it
is the conviction of the members of this
Society that the greatest promise for re-
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moving causes of conflict in the Church
lies in the elimination of unnecessary discretionary power in ecclesiastical administrators, and in the development of effective
guidelines, controls, and checks upon necessary discretionary power.
It is, consequently, to the resolution of
conflicts involving the exercise of administrative authority in the Church that this
report principally directs itself; it is in this
area that present-day conflicts are most
numerous, and it is in this area that grievances most often are based on the denial
of fundamental Christian rights.
Process for Conciliation
Love your enemies, do good to those who
hate you, bless those who curse you, pray
for those who treat you badly. To the man

who slaps you on one cheek, present the
other cheek too; to the man who takes your
cloak from you, do not refuse your tunic.
Give to everyone who asks you, and do not
ask for your property back from the man
who robs you. Treat others as you would
25
like them to treat you.

It is not the litigious, but the poor in
26
spirit who are called blessed by Jesus;
not judges, but peacemakers who are
promised a special reward in the kingdom.27 Forgiveness from the Father is
asked "as we have forgiven those who are
in debt to us."

28

The teaching of Christ on love of enemies, peace-making, and forgiveness is

25

6:27-31.

20
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specifically applied by St. Paul to litigation.
Christians are rebuked by him for litigat29
ing with one another before unbelievers.
Christians are told that "it is bad enough
for you to have law suits at all against one
another; oughtn't you to let yourselves be
wronged, and let yourselves be cheated?"""
In secular situations, litigation is a last
resort. Few controversies capable of judicial resolution are judicially resolved. Conflicts so acute that the parties to them seek
the counsel of lawyers are normally resolved by the lawyers through a negotiateJ
settlement. Even in the administration of
the criminal law, compromise is the usual
procedure. Courts function chiefly to set
the outer limits within which compromise
will be made. They could not possibly
adjudicate all conflicts which lawyers could
put before them. Without lawyers to resolve most conflicts, the courts could not
work at all.
Litigation as a way of reaching a just
result requires some sort of equality between the parties, an equality which courts
try to insure by isolating the judicial procedure from factors extraneous to the issue,
but which no court can insure if the parties
are unequal in their resources and ability
to engage in protracted litigation. Few persons have the resources and ability to
engage in protracted litigation with an
institution.
The Code of Canon Law itself discourages litigation as a method of resolving
disputes, and urges, in its stead, a process
of conciliation:

291 Cor. 6:1-6.
"l I Cor. 6:7-8.
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Since it is highly desirable that litigation
be avoided among the faithful, the judge
shall admonish the parties between whom
some civil controversy about their own private affairs has arisen and which they have
taken to court to have settled by judicial
trial, to come to a compromise, if there
appears to be some hope of a friendly
settlement. The judge can satisfy this duty
either before the parties are summoned to
court or when they are for the first time
in court or finally at any time that he
deems most opportune and effective for
proposing a compromise. 3'
For these several and convergent reasons, the members of this Society believe
that in the Church, which should not only
study secular example but also provide
example for the world, the primary process
for the resolution of disputes should not
be a process for the assertion of legal rights
but a process for the conciliation of human
persons.
It is the opinion of the Society that the
following elements are essential to any process for conciliation:
1. Each participant must have the opportunity of a face-to-face dialogue
with the person with whom he is in
conflict. To be treated as a human
person is to be given not only a
hearing, but a response. There is no
substitute for the dialogue of persons.

2. Unmediated dialogue may become
debate; each participant, therefore,
must have the opportunity of stating
his side of the conflict to a conciliator

:1

C.I.C., ch. 1925.

who will attempt to lead the participants to be reconciled with one another. The conciliator should be
informed of the facts and feelings
of each participant so that he may
understand what each participant believes to be "the real reason" for the
dispute.
3.

Dialogue and mediation will fail if
either side is convinced that abstract
principles such as "the right of conscience" or "the rights of authority"
be vindicated at any cost. There are
few imperatives of conscience that
make only one course of action mandatory, and few rights of authority
which can be asserted in only one
specific way.

4. Delay and concealment of relevant
information have no place in a process of conciliation. Wounds should
be healed quickly. Persons should
not be left in suspense about their
status for protracted periods. The
candor of brothers, not the paternalistic assumption that the truth
cannot be borne, must characterize
exchange designed to heal.
5.

The obligation rests with each person in authority or guided by authority to teach by his example that he
belongs to a religion whose essence
is love.

There is appended to this report a suggested plan for the establishment and procedures of a Process for Conciliation (Appendix A). The plan is intended to be only
a model, and it would be expected that
individual dioceses would adapt its provi-
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sions to local needs, or otherwise improve
upon them in furtherance of the common
good of the faithful.
Process for Arbitration
Hopefully the vast majority of controversies will be settled through the Process
for Conciliation. But because this will not
always be possible, it is the opinion of the
Society that there should be established a
Process for Arbitration for the resolution
of disputes not resolved by conciliation.
Arbitration is defined as the reference of
a dispute, by voluntary agreement of the
parties, to an impartial person or persons
for determination on the basis of evidence
and arguments presented by such parties,
who agree in advance to accept the decision of the arbitrator or arbitrators as final
and binding.
In referring a matter to arbitration, parties are presumed to have explored every
avenue of negotiation and settlement. It is
as a last resort that they call upon impartial
persons for a definitive decision and agree
to abide by the result. There is a note of
formality in arbitration proceedings, commensurate with the seriousness and importance which should characterize issues
brought for resolution to such a process,
and there should be some form of recording the proceedings. The time element involved in the various steps of arbitration
should be enforced since undue delay
prolongs injustice, and so is itself unjust.
An arbitrator must personally be neutral;
he must be objective, a person with judicial
temperament, able to listen well, to ask
good questions, to understand each party's
point of view. The principle of subsidiarity
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would call for a decision being made on a
local level whenever sufficient competence
is available; on the other hand, the principle of impartiality would indicate that a
panel of arbitrators should be selected on a
broader basis than the merely diocesan. A
regional panel of arbitrators would be
highly desirable.
As with the Process for Conciliation, so
in regard to Arbitration, the proposals of
this Society do not represent a radical
innovation in the governmental life of the
Church. The Code of Canon Law, in discouraging judicial litigation as a means of
resolving disputes, urges in its stead a
process for arbitration:
In order to avoid judicial litigation, the
parties may also make an agreement by
which the controversy is committed to the
judgment of one or several persons who
shall decide the dispute according to law,
or deal with the affair according to the
rules of equity. If they are to follow the
rules of law, they are called arbitri; if they
are to follow the dictates of equity, they
32
are called arbitratores.
There is appended to this report a suggested plan for the establishment of a
Process for Arbitration (Appendix B).
The plan is intended to be only a model,
and it would be expected that individual
dioceses would adapt the provisions to
local needs, or otherwise improve upon
them in furtherance of the common good
of the faithful. Moreover, in a matter so
complex as this, there are definite advantages to broad experimentation. For this
reason, dioceses which already have ini-

32 C.i.C., ch. 1929.
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tiated arbitration procedures according to
a plan different from the one proposed in
this report are encouraged to continue with
what they have so that eventually a proper
evaluation can be made of all programs
operative in this nation before any particular process or processes be solidified
into legislation.
Judicial Process
Notwithstanding the Christian preference
for resolving disputes through a process of
conciliation of persons rather than through
a process for the assertion of legal rights,
there remain values indigenous to the judicial process which should not be unavailable to the societal life of the Church.
Judicial interpretation of law, judicial delineation of rights, increasingly more precise
from case to case, and judicial precedent,
especially in the area of defining and protecting Christian rights, are values which
the members of this Society would regard
as fundamental to an enriching of the
governmental life of the Church.
It is the recommendation of the Society,
therefore, that pending the establishment
of administrative tribunals as part of the
revision of the Code of Canon Law, Ordinaries delegate judicial jurisdiction either
to existing diocesan tribunals, or to newly
created experimental tribunals, for the resolution of disputes between persons in the
Church and administrative authorities or
bodies within the diocese. It would be
hoped that the experience of such judicial
processes would provide the Church with
a valuable source of direction in the ongoing studies of the Commission for the
Revision of Canon Law.

Structuring Administrative Discretion
Not only is it important for ecclesial
society to provide mechanisms for the
peaceful and orderly conciliation, arbitration, and judicial resolution of disputes
when they arise, but also to create, as far
as is possible, an atmosphere of Christian
living in which disputes are less likely to
occur. As indicated earlier in this report,
disputes between individual members of
the Church and persons in positions of
authority in service to the Church arise
from a variety of situations in which individuals consider themselves aggrieved by
administrative action on the part of authority.
Administrative action usually involves
the exercise of a large amount of discretion
on the part of administrators. To the extent
that such discretion is uncontrolled and unchecked there exist wide possibilities not
only for administrative actions which are
in fact arbitrary and unjust, but, more
significantly for the rise of disputes in the
ecclesial community, manifold possibilities
for widespread supposition on the part of
those affected that the actions were arbitrary and unjust. Whence arise a proliferation of complaints against authority, of
accusations and counter-accusations, and
of long and bitter conflicts.
No governmental system in history
has been without significant discretionary
power; none can be, and the Church's
governing authority should be no exception. Discretion is indispensable for tailoring decisions to unique facts and circumstances in particular cases, and for creative
solutions to new problems. Total elimination
of discretionary power would cripple au-
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thority's service to the people by depriving
that service of all flexibility.
The conceded need for necessary discretionary power in Church administrators,
however, must not be allowed to becloud
one's vision either of the large opportunities for abuse of such powers or of the
co-existence of much unnecessary discretionary power which has been allowed to
grow up in the Church.
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There is appended to this report a series
of proposals for structuring administrative
discretion (Appendix C); it is the opinion
of the members of this Society that the
preventive steps therein suggested would
do much to eliminate unnecessary discretionary power in ecclesiastical administrators, and to minimize the likelihood of
injustice, real or supposed, following upon
the exercise of administrative authority in
the Church.
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APPENDIX A
PROCESS FOR CONCILIATION

ARTICLE

I.

ESTABLISHMENT

1. Each diocese accepting this proposal shall set up a "Council of Conciliation," composed as follows:
Two persons appointed by the Ordinary of the diocese;
Two persons elected by the Priests' Senate of the Diocese or, if
there is no senate, by all the clergy of the diocese;
One person elected by the faculty of the Catholic college of the
diocese. If there is more than one Catholic college, the colleges, in
alphabetical order, shall rotate the election. If there is no Catholic
college, then the Priests' Senate shall elect three persons, or if there
is no senate, all the clergy of the diocese shall elect three persons.
2. The term of office shall be three years.
3. These exceptions shall apply to the initial Members of the Council:
The first appointee of the Ordinary shall have a term of three
years.
The person receiving the largest vote from the Priests' Senate or
clergy shall have a term of two years.
The person elected by the Catholic college faculty shall have a
term of two years.
The second appointee of the Ordinary shall have a term of one
year.
The person receiving the second largest vote from the Priests'
Senate or clergy shall have a term of one year.
4. The Council shall elect its Chairman, Secretary and Treasurer.
5. The diocese shall reimburse the Council for its expenses upon presentation of a statement signed by the Chairman and Treasurer.
6. The establishment of the Council, its purposes, the biographies of its
Members, and its rules of operation shall be announced by a letter from
.the Ordinary to the clergy and faithful of the diocese and by appropriate publicity in the diocesan and secular press.

ARTICLE II.

STARTING THE PROCESS

1. Any person in conflict with the Ordinary of the diocese, an appointee
of the Ordinary, a priest in the diocese, a Catholic college, hospital, or
other charitable or educational institution in the diocese, a parish or a
diocesan council, a parish or dicesan school board, a Catholic cem-
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etery organization or burial association, or any other person, group or
institution exercising administrative authority in the diocese, may have
recourse to the Council.
2. A person having recourse to the Council shall be styled the "initiating
participant," and the person, group or institution with whom he is in
conflict shall be styled the "convoked participant." Recourse to the
Council shall be styled "the initiative," and the acceptance of a process
for reconciliation by the convoked participant shall be styled "an
affirmative response." The conflict shall be designated as "the problem."
3. An initiating participant may take the initiative by sending to any
Member of the Council a statement that he has a problem involving
one or more of the persons, groups or institutions described in paragraph one, and setting forth the gist of the problem.
4. The Member receiving this statement shall contact the convoked participant both in writing and by telephone, shall apprise him of the
problem stated by the initiating participant, and shall inquire if he will
accept conciliation. The convoked participant shall be given a description of the purposes of the Council of Conciliation, the biographies of
its Members, and a copy of its rules of procedure. He shall be asked if
he would accept as a conciliator the Member addressed by the initiating
participant or if he would prefer that the Chairman designate a different
Member or Members. He shall be advised that the Council is supposed
to proceed with dispatch and that his affirmative response to the initiative is expected within two weeks of the notice to him.
5. If the convoked participant fails to give an affirmative response, the
Member shall refer the matter to the Chairman who shall endeavor to
persuade the convoked participant to give such response.
6. If, four weeks from the date of the initiative, no affirmative response
has been made by the convoked participant, the Member shall refer
the matter to the Ordinary who shall endeavor to persuade the convoked participant to give such response.
7. In the event that the convoked participant is the Ordinary of the diocese
himself, the provisions of paragraph six shall not apply, and if, four
weeks from the date of the initiative, there is no affirmative response,
the Member shall refer the matter to the Chairman of the Bishops'
Committee on Arbitration and Mediation, who, by telephone and letter
and, if possible, by personal conference, shall endeavor to persuade the

Ordinary to give such response.
8. In the event that the Member fails to discharge any of his responsi-

bilities for referring the matter to the Ordinary or the Chairman of
the Bishops' Committee, as the case may be, the initiating participant
may ask the Chairman of the Council of Conciliation to make the
referral; should the Chairman fail to do so, the initiating participant
may make the referral himself.
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ARTICLE III.

THE PROCESS

1. The Member addressed by the initiating participant and agreed to by
the convoked participant shall act as conciliator in the process. In the
event there is no agreement, the Chairman shall designate a Member or
Members to act as conciliator or conciliators in the process.
2. Within three weeks of the affirmative response, the conciliating Member
shall meet alone with each participant for oral discussion of the
problem.
3. Within one week of the second of these conferences, the Member shall
meet with both participants together and endeavor to guide them to a
peaceful resolution of their problem. The Member shall schedule as
many of these joint meetings as seem to him to be necessary in order to
progress to conciliation.
4. The Member shall endeavor to assure that each participant answers the
questions which the other participant believes are essential if he is to
understand the actions of the other. While the Member should exercise
his discretion, he should act in the knowledge that paternalistic concealment of facts is no longer an acceptable mode of behavior to many
persons, and he should, therefore, encourage a trust in candor on both
sides.
5. The first joint meeting of the participants and the Member shall be
restricted to these persons. Thereafter, in the discretion of the Member,
each participant may have with him one or two advisers-theologians,
lawyers, friends, or whomever he chooses. In the event that one participant desires to have such advisers, and the Member agrees, the
Member shall notify the other participant that he may come with an
equal number of advisers. In the discretion of the Member and with
the agreement of the participants other Members of the Council of
Conciliation or other persons may join the meetings from time to time.
6.

If the problem is resolved by agreement, the Member shall prepare a
summary statement of the problem and its resolution, and shall submit
it for the approval and signature of the participants. If the problem is
unresolved after the meetings arranged by the Member have been
held, and, in any event, if the problem is unresolved six months from
the initiative, the Member shall ask the participants if they are willing
to continue discussion of the problem with him, with another Member
of the Council, with a person designated by the Ordinary, or, in a case
where the Ordinary is participant, with a person designated by the
Chairman of the Bishops' Committee on Arbitration and Mediation. If
the participants agree in their response, the Member shall arrange the
desired continuation. If one or more participants declines to engage in
further discussion, the Member shall file a report with the Council and,
where the Ordinary is participant, with the Chairman of the Bishops'
Committee on Arbitration and Mediation. This report shall contain the
names of the participants, a summary of the problem and the discus-
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sions taken to resolve it, and certification by the Member that, despite
the good faith of the participants, no resolution could be reached.
7.

The Member shall have no power to force the participants to adopt a
solution. He shall have power, however, to determine that any participant is not cooperating in good faith. Prima facie evidence of lack of
good faith will be failure to attend three scheduled meetings, failure to
respond to a substantial number of questions which the Member believes
appropriate, or failure to suggest any way of accommodating the interests of the other participant. In the event that for these or other
reasons the Member believes that a participant is not cooperating in
good faith, he shall apprise him of this belief orally and, failing cooperation, shall apprise him again in writing. If there is no cooperation
after the written communication, the Member shall at once notify the
Ordinary of the diocese, or, if the Ordinary is a participant, the Chairman of the Bishops' Committee on Arbitration and Mediation. The
Ordinary or the Chairman shall endeavor to persuade the participant to
cooperate.

8.

Meetings shall be private without publicity. All communications made
to a Member or between participants shall be treated as confidential by
all who share in them. If the problem is resolved by agreement, and the
parties agree to publicizing the solution, announcement of it shall be
made. If there is no agreement on a solution or on publicizing it, no
announcement shall be made.
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APPENDIX B
PROCESS FOR ARBITRATION

ARTICLE

I.

ESTABLISHMENT

1. Each diocese accepting this proposal shall set up an "Office of Arbitration." The Office shall consist of five persons, two of whom shall be
appointed by the Ordinary, and three shall be selected by the Priests'
Senate, or, if there is no senate, by all the clergy of the diocese.
2. The members of the Office of Arbitration shall serve for a term of three
years. No member shall have more than two consecutive terms in office.
For the purposes of continuity, the terms of the initial members
shall be staggered in the following manner:
The first appointee of the Ordinary shall have a term of three years.
The second appointee of the Ordinary shall have a term of two
years.
The first person chosen by the Priests' Senate, or clergy of the
diocese, shall have a term of three years.
The second person chosen by the Priests' Senate, or clergy of the
diocese, shall have a term of two years.
The third person chosen by the Priests' Senate, or clergy of the
diocese, shall have a term of one year.
3. The Office of Arbitration shall select from its own members a chairman
and a secretary-treasurer, each of whom shall serve for a term of one
year in that respective capacity.
4. It shall be the responsibility of the Office of Arbitration:
a. to select a sufficient number of qualified persons to be arbitrators;
b. to accept all complaints made to it in writing by any member
of the diocese and to determine whether or not the case falls
within the competence of the Office as set forth in Article IV;
c.

to assist the parties in the selection of an arbitrator; and

d. to supervise and administer the over-all program and to interpret rules of procedure to be followed in arbitration when
questions are referred to it by either the arbitrators or the
parties themselves.
ARTICLE

II.

SELECTION OF ARBITRATORS

1. Arbitrators should be selected for their impartiality and competence.
a. Impartiality. The arbitrator must receive no direct benefit from
the outcome of the decision he makes.
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The following, therefore, are disqualified to serve as arbitrators:
i. Anyone related by consanguinity or affinity to one or another of the parties, or who is a guardian of one of the
parties.
ii. Anyone involved with one or another of the parties in
such a way as to have a particular interest in the outcome
of the dispute.
iii. Anyone who can be shown to be inimical to one of the
parties.
b. Competence. The arbitrator should have some understanding of
how a hearing should be conducted. Expertise in the area under
discussion is helpful, but not absolutely necessary. If the arbitrator is not himself an expert, he should feel free to call in
experts during the hearing.
2. Method of Selection in General
a. It is the responsibility of the Office of Arbitration in each
diocese to select a panel of arbitrators from among the laity,
religious, and clergy. It is not necessary that a person be a
member of the diocese in order to be included on the panel of
arbitrators. It is recommended that there be an exchange of
panels between neighboring dioceses where possible.
b. The Office of Arbitration has the responsibility of screening
candidates for the panel of arbitrators. The Office shall solicit
nominations from any organized group in the diocese, or in
any other way to be determined by the Office itself.
c. There shall be maintained a minimum panel of ten arbitrators
in order to insure an adequate choice of selection for the
parties.
3. Method of Selection for a Specific Case
a. If the arbitration agreement applicable to a particular case
provides a method of appointment of arbitrators, this method
shall be followed. In the absence thereof, or if the agreed
method fails or for any reason cannot be followed, or when an
arbitrator appointed fails or is unable to act, and no provision
has been made for the appointment of his successor, the Office
of Arbitration on application of a party shall appoint one or
more arbitrators. An arbitrator so appointed has all the powers
of one specifically named in the agreement.
b. In the event the arbitration agreement does not provide a
method of appointment of arbitrators, the Chairman of the
Office of Arbitration shall appoint arbitrators according to the
following procedure:
i. The Chairman of the Office of Arbitration shall
submit to each party a list of arbitrators, large enough
to assure adequate choice.
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ii. The parties shall strike out those names not acceptable
to themselves and list the others in the order of their
preference.
iii. The Chairman of the Office of Arbitration shall then
appoint three arbitrators, following as closely as possible the selection of the parties.
iv. The Office of Arbitration shall draft and enforce its
own rules with regard to time limits for making the
selection, and the consequences of not observing the
time limits.

ARTICLE III.

PROCEDURE

1. Initiation of Arbitration
The parties shall submit to the Chairman of the Office of Arbitration a written statement setting forth the nature of the dispute and
the remedies sought.
2. Time and Place of Hearing
The arbitrators shall appoint a time and place for hearings and
notify the parties not less than five days before each hearing.
3. Representation by Counsel
Parties to the dispute may be represented at hearings by counsel
or other authorized representative.
4. Attendance at Hearings
Persons having a direct interest in the arbitration are entitled to
attend hearings. It shall be in the discretion of the arbitrators to
determine the propriety of the attendance of any other person.
5. Adjournments
For good cause the arbitrators may adjourn the hearing upon the
request of a party or upon their own initiative, and shall adjourn
when all the parties agree thereto.
6. Arbitration in the Absence of a Party
Arbitration may proceed in the absence of any party who, after
due notice, fails to be present or to obtain an adjournment.
7. Evidence
The arbitrators shall hear and determine the controversy upon the
evidence produced. Parties may offer such evidence as they desire
and shall produce such additional evidence as the arbitrators may
deem necessary to an understanding and determination of the
dispute. The arbitrators shall judge the relevancy and materiality
of the evidence offered, and conformity to legal rules of evidence
shall not be necessary. All evidence shall be taken in the presence
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of all of the arbitrators and all of the parties except where any of
the parties is absent in default or has waived his right to be present.
The arbitrators may require the parties to submit books, records,
documents, and other evidence.
8. Evidence by Affidavit
The arbitrators shall have the power to administer oaths and to
take evidence from witnesses by deposition whenever witnesses
cannot attend the hearing.
9. Order of Proceedings
A hearing shall be opened by the recording of the place, time, and
date of hearing, the presence of the arbitrators and parties, the
presence of counsel, if any, and the receipt by the arbitrators of
initial statements setting forth the nature of the dispute and the
remedies sought.
The arbitrator may, in his discretion, vary the normal procedure
under which the initiating party first presents his claim, but in any
case shall afford full and equal opportunity to all parties for presentation of relevant proofs.
The names and addresses of all witnesses, and exhibits offered in
evidence, shall be made a part of the record.
10. Majority Decision
In the course of the hearing, all decisions of the arbitrators shall
be by a majority vote. The award shall also be made by majority
vote unless the concurrence of all is expressly required by the
terms of a particular arbitration agreement.
11. Closing of Hearings
The arbitrators shall inquire of all parties whether they have any
further proof to offer or witnesses to be heard. Upon receiving
negative replies, the arbitrator shall declare the hearings closed.
The hearings may be reopened by the arbitrators on their own
motion, or on the motion of either party, for good cause shown,
at any time before the award is made.
12. Time of Award
The award shall be rendered promptly by the arbitrators and,
unless otherwise agreed by the parties, not later than thirty days
from the date of closing the hearings, or if oral hearings have been
waived, then from the date of transmitting the final statements and
proofs to the arbitrator.
13. Form of Award
The award shall be in writing and shall be signed by the arbitrators.
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14. Stenographic Record
Provision for recording the entire proceedings may be made at the
request of either party, or at the discretion of the arbitrators. The
total cost of such a record shall be shared equally among parties
ordering copies, unless the parties agree otherwise.
15. Interpretation and Application of Rules
Questions concerning the interpretation of these rules shall be
referred to the Office of Arbitration for final decision.

ARTICLE IV.

COMPETENCE

1. The process for arbitration shall extend:
a. To all disputes between individual members of the Church, or
groups within the Church, where the controversy concerns an
ecclesiastical matter;
b. To all disputes between a person and a diocesan administrator
or administrative body, where it is contended that an act or
decision (including administrative sanctions and disciplinary
actions) has violated Church law or natural equity; and
c. To all disputes between administrative bodies of the diocese
when the dispute involves conflict of competency.
2. The following, however, shall not be subject to settlement by arbitration:
a.

Criminal cases in the strict sense (not administrative sanctions
and disciplinary actions);

b. Non-criminal cases where there is question of dissolving a
marriage;
c. Matters pertaining to benefices when there is litigation about
the title itself to a benefice unless the legitimate authorities
sanction arbitration; and
d. Spiritual matters whenever the award requires payment by
means of temporal goods.
3. Disputes involving temporal ecclesiastical goods or those things which,
though annexed to the spiritual, can be dealt with apart from their
spiritual aspect, may be settled through arbitration, but the formalities
of law for the alienation of ecclesiastical property must be observed if
the matter is of sufficient importance.

ARTICLE

V.

EXPENSES

1. All members of the Office of Arbitration, as well as all arbitrators shall
serve gratis. The parties involved in the arbitration, however, shall be
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assessed a fee in an amount to be determined by the Office of Arbitration to cover Office expenses.
2. The expenses of witnesses shall be paid by the respective parties
producing witnesses. Traveling and other expenses of the arbitrators,
and the expenses of any witnesses or the cost of any proofs produced
at the direct request of the arbitrators, shall be borne equally by the
parties unless they agree otherwise, or unless the arbitrator in his award
assesses such expenses or any part thereof against any specified party or
parties.

ARTICLE VI.

COURT OF ARBITRATION

1. There shall be established in each diocese a Court of Arbitration. This
Court will function as a board of review. It will not review the merits
of the case as such, but rather its purpose will be to hear and render
decisions on complaints of nullity or requests for corrections or modifications of the award.
If a tribunal already exists in a particular diocese, this tribunal
will perform the function of the Court of Arbitration. A special turnus
of judges shall be assigned to handle matters of this nature.
2. The Court of Arbitration shall be competent to review an arbitration
award where it is alleged that:
a. The award was procured by corruption, fraud, or other undue
means;
b. There wa! evident partiality on the part of an arbitrator;
c. The arbitrators exceeded their powers;
d. The arbitrators refused to postpone a hearing notwithstanding
the showing of sufficient cause for such postponement, or refused to hear evidence material to the controversy, or otherwise
conducted the hearing so as prejudicially to affect a substantial
right of one of the parties;
e.

The method of selection of arbitrators, agreed upon by the
parties beforehand, was not followed;

f. The decision was based on documents which are spurious;
g. New evidence has been discovered of a character which demands a contrary decision;
h. Principles of fundamental procedural fairness were violated.
3. Where the Court of Arbitration decides in favor of the nullity of an
arbitration award, the Court can order a rehearing either before the
arbitrators who made the award or before entirely new arbitrators
chosen in the same manner as the original arbitrators.
Where an application to vacate an award or nullify a decision is
denied, the Court of Arbitration shall confirm the award.
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4. Correction or Modification of the Award
Where it is alleged that there was a material error in transcribing
the award, in relating the petition of the parties or the facts in describing any person, thing, or property referred to in the award, in
making calculations or in matters of form not affecting the merits of
the controversy, corrections may be made by the arbitrators themselves
upon petition of the party, unless the other party opposes such corrections. In the latter event the matter shall be referred to the Court of
Arbitration for decision and, where appropriate, for correction or
modification of the Award.

ARTICLE VII.

FORM OF AGREEMENT

1. General Agreement
For arbitration procedures to be of maximum service to a diocese,
it is highly desirable that as many persons as possible enter into prior
agreement to submit to arbitration disputes that may arise among them
which cannot be settled by conciliation.
It is desirable, therefore, that the Ordinary, after establishing by
law the Office of Arbitration, enter into a contract with the priests of
the diocese in which he, as well as they, agree to submit to arbitration
any controversy that may arise among them in the diocese. If there is
to be any limitation of the matters which may be brought to arbitration,
over and above the limits set forth in Article IV above, this should
clearly be stated in the contract.
A sample agreement of this kind reads as follows:
recogWe, the bishops and priests of the diocese of _,
nizing the value of a process for arbitration commensurate with
the needs of our times and the expectations of our people, vote for
the establishment of an Office of Arbitration in this diocese, and
agree to submit to arbitration, in accordance with the rules and
procedures of such Office, any and all controversies arising among
all in the diocese.
2. Specific Agreement
In individual instances of submission of disputes to arbitration it
is advisable for the parties to sign a specific agreement, either by way
of modification of a general arbitration agreement or in the absence of
such a general agreement, covering such matters as the number of
arbitrators, the method of their selection, and, where no general arbitration agreement exists between the parties, the voluntary commitment to
accept the decision of the arbitrator(s) as final and binding.
Even in those cases where arbitration is consequent upon a prior
general agreement, it is desirable that, at the time of the initiation of
arbitration, both parties sign a specific agreement of this nature. A
sample of such an agreement might read:

304

15 CATHOLIC LAWYER, AUTUMN 1969
We, the undersigned parties, hereby agree to submit to arbitration
under the rules of the Office of Arbitration, the following controversy: (cite briefly). We further agree that the above controversy be submitted to (1) (3) arbitrators, selected from the panel
of arbitrators submitted by the Office of Arbitration. We further
agree that we will faithfully observe this agreement and the rules,
and that we will abide by and perform any award rendered by the
arbitrators.
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APPENDIX C
STRUCTURING ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION

I.

DELINEATION OF COMPETENCE

The first step in confining discretionary power within proper limits, and
in controlling its exercise within those limits, is a clear delineation of the
competence of the particular administrative organ or individual administrator. Such delineation should be found in the enabling legislation, or if
none, in the decree of episcopal or presbyteral authority, which brings the
particular administrative organ into existence.
When the limits of competence are not known either to those charged
with the responsibility of administration or to those who are to be affected
by the acts of administration, opportunity for misunderstanding, mistrust,
and conflict is great.

II. POLICY-STATING
There should be published by an administrator or administrative body
the considerations, the criteria, and the standards that will guide decisions
to be made in individual cases.
Thus, for example, a School Board should state its basic policies in
regard to hiring and firing teachers; a diocesan Personnel Board should make
known its criteria for recommending appointments to pastorates; a Building
Commission should publish the guidelines that will govern its decisions on
applications for construction; a pastor should make clear his standards for
the admission of students to the parochial school within his parish.
Such detailed and precise policy statements would give some assurance
of consistency in reaching decisions, and hence some assurance of equal
justice by moving from a system of ad hoe determinations of policy in particular cases to a system of pre-announced policy determinations. By giving
parties prior knowledge of the administrator's position, knowledgeable efforts
to meet standards and so to receive a favorable administrative decision are
made possible. Moreover, it becomes possible to obtain intelligent review,
not only of published policies before proper authorities, but also, in conciliation, arbitration, or judicial proceedings, to obtain review of alleged
unfair or arbitrary decisions in individual cases.
Policy-stating should be preceded by an open policy-making procedure
which makes available to interested persons information concerning what
policy problems are under consideration, what criteria are being considered,
and the reasons underlying the proposed policy. Interested persons should
be invited to offer suggestions and criticisms.
Such a procedure would gain for administrative bodies and administrators the benefit of ideas contributed by many qualified persons, and would
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minimize subsequent tensions arising out of the application to individuals
of policies of which they had no knowledge and to which they had no opportunity to raise objections.

III.

FINDINGS, REASONS,

PRECEDENTS

Written findings of fact and reasoned opinions in support of administrative decisions should be issued whenever discretionary power is exercised
in such a way as to adversely affect the rights of persons in the Church.
Such a procedure would minimize careless or hasty action, insure the
consideration of important facts and ideas, and enable an adversely affected
party to change his circumstances, if possible, so as to obtain a favorable
decision in the future. It would also facilitate judicial review of administrative decisions, and make possible, in conciliation and arbitration proceedings, intelligent review of alleged arbitrariness or unfairness.
The writing of reasoned opinions should lead to the development of a
system of precedents to guide future administrative decisions and to furnish
affected parties with a basis for making intelligent estimates of future administrative action. The resulting growth in consistency of administrative
action in the Church will do much to minimize suspicion of arbitrariness
and injustice.
It is essential that findings, decisions, and precedents be as open as possible, consistent with appropriate protection of privacy and confidentiality.
Openness is a natural enemy of arbitrariness in the exercise of discretion,
and a natural protection against the hostility and conflict that abound in an
atmosphere of suspected injustice. Few things spawn as much conflict in the
Church as uncontrolled discretionary power exercised through administrative
decisions secretly made, insulated from criticism, unsupported by findings of
fact, unexplained by reasoned opinions, and free from any requirement of
consistency in the light of precedents.

IV.

FAIRNESS OF PROCEEDINGS

Justice to individual parties in the Church is administered or denied far
more outside than within formal tribunal procedure. Whatever is to be said
of the adequacy of provisions in Church law for the protection of the rights
of persons in ecclesiastical court proceedings, it is essential that adequate
procedural protections be developed for the rights of persons likely to be
affected by extra-judicial discretionary determinations of ecclesiastical administrators.
It is a mandate of fundamental fairness that a person likely to be adversely affected by administrative action be informed of the proposed action
and of the reasons underlying it, and be given adequate opportunity to respond.
It is a mandate of fundamental fairness that information concerning a
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person is not to be used as a basis for administrative action adversely affecting that person without disclosing to the person that the information is to
be used, and without affording opportunity for explanation, rebuttal, or
denial of the "information" in question. Exceptions to this principle of
fundamental fairness should be extremely rare and only in the interest of
protecting confidentiality deemed essential to the good order of the ecclesial community. 33
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